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FOREWORD
EVIDENCE SYMPOSIUM: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF FEDERAL AND NEW YORK
EVIDENCE LAW
Honorable Frank X. Altimari*
In giving evidence we are furnishing to a tribunal a new basis for
reasoning. This is not saying that we do not have to reason in
order to ascertain this basis; it is merely saying that reasoning
alone will not, or at least does not, supply it. The new element
which is added is what we call the evidence. I
The Editors of the Touro Law Review, Professor Martin A.
Schwartz, Professor Deborah S. Bartel, Professor Peter A.
Zablotsky, and the Honorable George C. Pratt are to be
commended on their Symposium, Comparing New York and
Federal Evidence Law. The impressive panel of evidence
* The Honorable Frank X. Altimari currently sits as a Judge

for the

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. He was appointed in 1985,
having served as a United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New
York since 1982. Judge Altimari graduated from St. Francis College in 1948
and received an LL.B. from Brooklyn Law School in 1951.
I. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A SELECTION OF CAsEs ON EVIDENCE AT
THE COMMON LAW 2 (2d ed. 1900).
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scholars that participated in this Symposium, and whose articles
follow, have vividly revealed the breadth and complexity of
issues presented by modem evidence law. Given that the law of
evidence is one of the basic structural underpinnings of our legal
system, this issue of the Touro Law Review will be of great
interest to the bench, bar, and law schools nationwide.
The accurate determination of facts is the fundamental objective
of the law of evidence. Evidentiary doctrine provides a
framework within which the most complete and trustworthy
information can be ascertained in an effort to discover truth,
enforce substantive law, and vindicate legal rights in a judicial
tribunal. While evidentiary precedents, rules, and procedures are
designed primarily to facilitate the proof of substantive claims,
the law of evidence also serves to keep the judicial system fair
and the power among the litigants, judges, and jurors balanced.
My experience on the bench has given me a unique perspective
on the law of evidence. As a trial judge, I was keenly aware that,
because evidentiary rulings play an important role in effectuating
our law's substantive goals, the standards governing the
evidentiary process must serve the overriding aims of the
substantive law. At the appellate level, I recognize that
meaningful review of the trial court's application of evidence law
is necessary to secure coherent and consistent administration of
justice. My view of the evidentiary process for the last twelve
years has been distinctly federal-oriented, with great support for
the Federal Rules of Evidence. However, my sixteen years of
prior service on the New York State bench provided me with an
appreciation for New York's common law of evidence and the
difficulties surrounding the New York State legislature's attempts
to enact a code of evidence based in part on the federal model.
Nearly a generation after the Federal Rules of Evidence were
enacted, I am impressed with the level of refinement the Federal
Rules have brought to the law of evidence. Many of the legal
scholars at this Symposium agreed that the Federal Rules of
Evidence have brought uniformity, predictability, and efficiency
to the bench and bar. Others who participated in the Symposium,
however, are cautious about whether codification of the law of
evidence has achieved its goals of simplification and the
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provision of clear, precise, and readily available rules for trial
judges and litigants.
In any event, the distinguished scholars whose articles follow
have substantially contributed to the current explosion of
evidence scholarship, which seeks to analyze evidentiary
problems under the federal model and state law to the end that
exposure and critical commentary might improve the
development of evidence law. While an emerging focus
throughout their discussions is the current debate over the
codification of New York's evidence law, other topics addressed
include character evidence, coconspirator statements, former
testimony, hearsay, rape shield laws, expert testimony, and
hypnotically-refreshed testimony.
Advocates of codification, such as Professor Barbara C.
Salken, set forth a number of arguments that justice is best served
by consolidating the common law and statutory rules of evidence
in a unified, accessible, handbook form. They assert that not only
will evidentiary codification improve the quality of the bench and
bar, but the drafting process itself will modernize and clarify
New York's common law principles and statutory provisions. As
in any debate, the opponents often present persuasive arguments
which compel one to re-think his own position. Opponents view
codification as an overstated reformation of some archaic
evidentiary principles that will ultimately impede judicial
progress. They fear that it will freeze the development of
evidence law, will politicize the law of evidence, will vest too
much discretion in the trial judge, and is unnecessary because the
present system is working. Professor Salken discusses these
issues and concludes that these fears are unfounded.
Sides have been taken in this debate. There are even those who
have taken a middle ground, who believe that the differences
between New York evidence law and the Federal Rules of
Evidence are being over-emphasized. Professor Richard Farrell
espouses this view, citing nuance differences. However, he does
concede that the common law system is not as efficient as the
legislative alternative. Accordingly, he predicts that the
proponents of codification will prevail.
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My dear friend Judge Pratt observes, and I wholeheartedly
agree, that judges are extremely interested in an evidence code
that is readily accessible in a single, authoritative volume. Such a
manuscript enables litigants and judges to start from the same
point and be guided by the same rules, while forcing litigants to
categorize their objections. It also enables the judiciary to be
more responsive to the suddenness with which evidence problems
arise and the accompanying need for time-efficient
determinations.
The question of admissibility of character evidence under
federal and state law challenges us to evaluate the courts'
different approaches. While the general rule is that proof of a
person's character or trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving actual conformity on a particular occasion,
Professor James Kainen examines the two limited categories of
exceptions to this rule under New York and federal law, namely
credibility character evidence and substantive character evidence.
In his article, he considers specifically the problematic nature of
the courts' approaches to the admissibility of a victim's character
trait offered by a defendant in a criminal action.
Although the results under both the federal and New York
evidence systems might be viewed as substantively the same, as
Professor Richard Farrell posits in his review of hearsay
evidence, closer examination of evidentiary actions in the Second
Circuit and the courts of New York reveal sharply different
outcomes. For example, evidence law governing the hearsay
exceptions for coconspirator statements and former testimony
differ dramatically in the courts of New York and the Second
Circuit. Under federal law, you can consider a proffered
coconspirator statement to determine the existence of a
conspiracy, while under New York law you cannot. Professor
Randolph N. Jonakait aptly analyzes these issues. He suggests
that coconspirator statements are inherently unreliable and
concludes that, because of the dangers posed by such biased
evidence, meaningful reform of this hearsay doctrine should be
attempted.
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In addition, Professor Jonakait examines former testimony in
light of the recent Second Circuit opinion, United States v.

DiNapoli,2 and explores the divergent approaches New York and
the Second Circuit have taken in admitting such evidence.
Professor Jonakait cautions that such evidence be admitted only
when accompanied by a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. He finds the Second Circuit's similar motive test
requirement of the former testimony exception narrower than the
Sixth Amendment and New York standard, and offers the thought
that perhaps former testimony is only trustworthy when the
similar intensity test, requiring that the party resisting the offered
testimony had a prior interest of similar intensity to challenge the
same side of a substantially similar issue, is satisfied.
In another provoking presentation, Professor Deborah Bartel
draws on the history of evidence scholarship to point out
opportunity for reform, and examines five differences between
the Federal Rules of Evidence and New York Criminal Procedure
Rape Shield statutes. 3 She ultimately suggests that the Federal
Rules of Evidence "catchall" exception be revised to model the
New York approach, and that the New York legislature adopt
notice requirements in its Rape Shield law to avoid unfair
surprise of the victim and prosecution, thus providing the court
with a more complete basis for evaluating the evidence.
The final two scholars in this Symposium draw on the
multidisciplinary mosaic of law, science, and technology to
consider expert testimony and hypnotically-enhanced testimony
under federal and state law. Professor Barry Scheck explores the
admission of expert testimony in the areas of psychiatry,
medicine, tape recordings, scientific methods and techniques,
handwriting analysis, DNA analysis, and sexual abuse and
trauma situations. Professor Scheck posits whether a defect in a
generally accepted technique is a matter of weight or a matter of
admissibility. Considering this question under the Daubert4 and
2. 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993).
3. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1992).
4. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.. 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993).
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Frye5 analysis, he concludes that it is a matter of admissibility
and suggests that such evidence be excluded.
Witness competency is the key issue where hypnoticallyenhanced testimony is entertained by a court. Because hypnosis
involves heightened suggestibility, confabulation and the
suspension of disbelief, Professor Gary Shaw cautions that the
admission of hypnotically-enhanced testimony at trial can be a
dangerous impediment to the accurate discovery of the truth.
While a multitude of viewpoints interplaying with complex
issues has been presented - all directed at ensuring an accurate
determination of facts in evidence - no single academic analysis
can adequately address all the facets of a judge's decision on
allowing evidence. For nearly thirty years, I have struggled with
whether or not to admit certain testimony. I must confess that I
have been both consciously and subconsciously driven and guided
by two precepts - relevancy and reliability. After all, we are in a
search for truth. If the evidence is relevant and reliable, why not
admit it? Why not let the jury weigh its probative value? It was
once said, "Truth crushed to earth will rise again on the wings of
angels." It may be that when we exclude certain testimony in a
desire to slavishly comply with an evidentiary rule, we are
crushing truth. It is the doctrinaire fixity of views, and the
slavish compliance with the litany of rules which is most
troublesome and continues to encourage me to rely on relevancy
and reliability.
I have the utmost faith and trust in the ability of jurors to
evaluate the evidence presented to them. The conscientious and
intelligent nature of the vast majority of men and women who sit
as jurors insures the just resolution of disputes through the
presentation of the evidence. When we think of all the major
judgments people make everyday after hearing all sorts of
statements, it makes one think - why not let jurors hear testimony
that is reliable and relevant? Indeed, given that the law of
evidence is based upon certain assumptions that we make about
people, such as their perceptions, memory, thought processes,
and experiences, ordinary citizens are in the best position to
5. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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make impartial decisions. Jurors are well-schooled in discerning
truth and verifying facts as well as recognizing exaggerations,
misstatements, half-truths, and lies. They know by their very
existence, by the weight of life's struggles, by experiences in the
workplace, and by simply living in a purist society. I, for one,
trust them. This trust is born of experience and necessity.
An ordinary citizen, when sitting as a juror sworn to do justice,
somehow and in some way - in almost a mystical way - becomes

a very special person. If it is relevant and reliable, let them hear
it - their luminous, uncommon common sense and devotion to
their duty as jurors will compel them to separate the wheat from
the chaff and arrive at the truth.
This Symposium has provoked much thought and useful
discussion concerning evidentiary problems under the federal
model and New York law. The value of such professional debate,
however, lies not simply in the resolution of the issues
considered, but also in the uncertainty which compels one to
remain open-minded and continue thinking. When thinking, one
moves closer to the truth. Herman Melville once wrote that "[a]ll
deep, earnest thinking is but the intrepid effort of the soul to keep
the open independence of her sea," and to hold steadfast against
"the wildest winds of heaven and earth [which] conspire to cast
her on the treacherous, slavish shore." 6 While the treatment of
the problems posed in this Symposium Issue may not leave the
reader with clear answers, the proliferation of ideas concerning
evidentiary doctrine presented has certainly placed the search for
solutions on the high seas of thought.

6. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 153 (1930).
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